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Popular responses to the election of people’s courts,  
1948-1954
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In 1949, soviet oficials in saratov and kyiv discovered the comments above on 
the back of election ballots during the irst soviet campaigns to elect people’s 
courts.3 these highly differing reactions to the elections encompass the range of 
popular responses to the massive campaign that swept through the soviet union 
beginning in october 1948. As with other soviet mobilizations of the population, 
the responses of the people ranged from accommodation and acclaim to open 
1. Elections are oppression, everyone cries, but goes. tsentral´nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads´kykh ob´iednan´ ukrainy (tsDAHo),  f. 1, op. 23, d. 5997, l. 214.
2. Freely I approach the ballot box//With a song in my soul// For the people’s justice//I give my vote.//But I am not happy alone//the whole country is happy,//All the free peoples//Vote just like I… Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii saratovskoi oblasti (GAnIso), f. 594, op. 2, d. 629, l. 75-6.
3. For a brief time, after the Bolshevik revolution, people’s courts were popularly elected in some localities. see john n. Hazard, settling Disputes in soviet society: the Formative Years of legal Institutions (new York: Columbia uP, 1960), 51, 62-63. Centrally organized campaigns to elect people’s courts began in 1948 as described below.
Cahiers du Monde russe, 53/1, janvier-mars 2012, p. 121-139.
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criticism. this article analyzes individuals’ responses to lectures about soviet 
justice, the legal discourse exhibited during election-time meetings, and how the 
population reacted to voting for their local judges. It provides a composite picture 
of the campaigns to elect judges in 1948, 1951, and 1954, and demonstrates how 
the population used the elections as a means to pursue their own ends. these 
elections allowed the state to construct and reinforce its ideology on a grand scale, 
while at the same time giving the population an opportunity to criticize the legal 
system’s workings openly and help alter its future developments after the elections.
Students of Soviet elections have shown how elections functioned as a time 
when citizens could bargain with agitators and other representatives of the state 
about a wide array of daily and more political concerns.4 this article analyzes how 
popular responses during judicial elections illustrate popular and oficial anxieties 
as well as the negotiations previously described. utilizing a barrage of lectures, 
radio programs, ilms, and popular participation, the state attempted to inculcate 
an understanding of the value and meaning of law in soviet citizens during these 
campaigns. Consequently, these elections focused the full attention of the state’s 
information gathering organs onto its population. these organs aimed to shape 
the population and record its responses to the lessons being taught about soviet 
legal ideals. this makes the elections a useful stage from which to analyze popular 
knowledge and attitudes about soviet justice as well as the dificult postwar period 
in general. 
the campaigns followed the pattern of political elections familiar to the 
population since the late 1930s, yet the election of judges had a clear and palpable 
impact on daily life as those being elected decided all local civil and criminal cases. 
People’s courts were the lowest level of jurisdiction in the soviet legal system and 
a key point of interaction between the population and the state. Beyond a judge, two 
elected lay assessors sat on each people’s court. these elections initiated hundreds 
of individuals into judicial service as lay assessors in each locality. those that 
were not elected to serve learned about the legal system and their rights within 
it. Although the quality of the lectures and propaganda at the lowest levels was 
often poor, if not absent, the elections of people’s courts served as a three-month 
educational campaign on how the soviet legal system should function for the 
beneit of the population.5
4. see Victor Zaslavsky and robert j. Brym, “the Functions of Elections in the ussr”, Soviet 
Studies, vol. XXX, no. 3, (july 1978): 362-371, and serhy Yekelchyk,  “A Communal Model of Citizenship in stalinist Politics: Agitators and Voters in Postwar Electoral Campaigns (kyiv, 1946–53)”, Ab imperio, 2 (2010): 93-120.
5. For an insightful study of earlier attempts to educate the soviet masses, see Alexandre 
Sumpf, Bolcheviks en campagne : Paysans et éducation politique dans la russie des années 1920 (P.: Cnrs, 2010).
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the Constitution of 1936 and the Elections of People’s Courts
local party and legal oficials appointed people’s court judges through the irst 
decades of soviet history.6 the origin of the elections of people’s courts can be 
traced to article 109 of the stalin constitution of 1936, which included a provision 
to democratically elect judges and lay assessors to people’s courts. However, 
serious discussions about staging these elections began only in june 1941 within the 
Ministry of justice and sovnarkom. the second World War delayed the elections 
until late 1948 and early 1949. In the elections of people’s courts, the population 
of the soviet union voted for eight thousand judges and roughly six hundred 
thousand lay assessors.7 top Party oficials and the Ministry of justice directed 
the campaigns from Moscow, but local legal agencies and executive committees 
(ispolkom raiona/ goroda sovet deputatov trudiashchikhsia) were responsible for 
carrying out Moscow’s orders on the ground.8 the elections progressed along a set 
trajectory with intense agitation and lectures followed by nomination meetings. 
Compared to party and state elections, the campaigns to elect people’s courts have 
been largely neglected by historians.9 
In his work on the creation and circulation of the stalin constitution, j. Arch Getty 
describes the genesis of the irst elections based on the new principles of the 1936 
constitution.10 Initially the Party intended for the election of the supreme soviet in 
1937 to be openly contested with multiple candidates running for each seat. Getty 
describes how Andrei Zhdanov represented the faction pushing for more democratic 
elections within the leadership. Contested elections were “good international 
propaganda, good domestic public relations, and a centralizing and disciplining 
weapon against centrifugally minded local leaders.”11
nevertheless, on the eve of the elections, after months of preparations for 
holding multi-candidate elections, stalin chose to retreat from this position, and, 
instead, only allowed one candidate to run per position. Getty argues that this 
retreat from the ideals of the constitution came as a result of persistent pressure 
from local and republican leaders fearful of losing their seats in openly contested 
6. Peter H.  solomon jr., soviet Criminal justice under stalin (new York: Cambridge uP, 1996), 268.
7. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv rossiiskoi Federatsii (GArF), f. 9492, op. 1, d. 711, l. 2.
8. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 183, l. 352-353.
9. Yoram Gorlizki’s article, “Anti-Ministerialism and the ussr Ministry of justice, 1953-56: A study in organisational Decline”, Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 8 (December 1996): 1279-1318, touches on the elections peripherally. Peter solomon’s soviet Criminal justice under stalin also mentions the elections in passing.
10. see j. Arch Getty, “state and society under stalin: Constitutions and Elections in the 1930s”, Slavic Review, 50 (spring 1991): 18-35, and Getty, “‘Excesses Are not Permitted’: Mass terror and stalinist Governance in the late 1930s”, Russian Review, 61, 1 (jan. 2002): 113-138.
11. Getty, “state and society”, 33.
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elections.12 local leaders exploited Moscow’s fear of enemies from within in the 
context of the purges of 1937. A steady stream of complaints about the persistence 
of anti-soviet elements, kulaks, and religious believers coming from the provinces 
undermined the leadership’s faith in open elections and their electorate.13 in the 
end, these developments led to the established practice of stalinist elections being 
limited to a single candidate, in spite of the widely disseminated ideals of multiple 
candidate elections in 1937.
the retreat from multi-candidate elections rendered Soviet elections more 
about rubber stamping oficially chosen candidates than democratically selecting 
new ones. In 1948 the Moscow leadership decided to extend this distinctive 
electoral practice to the appointment of judges. Why did the leadership expend 
496 million rubles on the judicial election campaign across the soviet union after 
recently emerging from a catastrophic war and massive famine14? the high cost of 
the campaign during such a time of limited resources and reconstruction implies 
that the Moscow leadership viewed the campaign to elect judges as a valuable one.
At a variety of internal meetings, top party leaders and leading oficials from the 
Ministry of justice emphasized the importance of the elections to their audiences. For 
example, at a meeting of ukrainian regional party secretaries, nikita khrushchev, 
the irst party secretary for ukraine, declared the elections of judges a “political 
campaign” to emphasize its signiicance.15 the leadership considered the election 
campaign “political” because it was a mechanism to improve the performance of 
local legal organs and also to get regional legal oficials in line with Moscow’s 
direction. Finally, the elections were also an expression of a genuine interest in 
educating the population about soviet legal norms and ideals on the part of top 
oficials in the Ministry of justice. 
the elections of people’s courts emerged in the context of continuous reform 
within the legal ministries throughout the postwar period. the push to elect 
people’s courts in 1948 relected Moscow’s impatience with the progress of 
ongoing reforms, especially with the explosion of multiple corruption scandals 
and widespread popular concerns about crime. one of the most prominent reform 
campaigns began soon after the conclusion of World War II with a push for better 
education for legal cadres.
12. Getty, “state and society”, 32.
13. Getty, “‘Excesses Are not Permitted’”, 124-125.
14. the election budget for the ussr was 496,615,000 rubles. 270,910,000 rubles were dedicated to the elections in the rsFsr and 82,130,000 rubles were devoted to ukraine. For full statistics and budget, see GArF, f. 7523, op. 40, d. 172, l. 4. on the famine, see nicholas 
Ganson, the soviet Famine of 1946-47 in Global and Historical Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), and Veniamin Zima, Golod v sssr 1946-1947 godov (M.: rossisskaia akademiia nauk, 1996). Both these works expose how the famine of 1946-1947 continued to affect the soviet population into 1948 and beyond.
15. tsDAHo, f. 1, op. 23, d. 5610, l. 26.
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As Peter solomon shows, the push to educate the new legal oficials entering 
service en masse after the war relected the lack of conidence in the abilities of the 
judges and prosecutors working in the legal organs. solomon postulates that 
it may well be that stalin and the other leaders of… the soviet union… found the performance of the justice agencies embarrassing. If this were the case, the conversion of legal oficials from semi-competent amateurs to educated professionals was necessary not only to improve the actual administration of justice but also to make it presentable to the outside world.16 
As solomon illustrates, this campaign eventually succeeded in pushing legal cadres 
to get more education by the end of stalin’s reign even though the quality of that 
education was quite low.
nevertheless, the introduction of the campaign to elect people’s courts in 1948 
relected an impatience with the speed of the campaign to educate legal workers 
as well as continued dissatisfaction with the performance of legal agencies. the 
postwar Ministry of justice repeatedly denounced the high number of cases 
overturned on appeal, the moral and professional corruption of judges, and the long 
delays in carrying out court decisions. unsurprisingly, the stated and oft-repeated 
aim of the campaign to elect people’s courts was about improving the performance 
of the courts. Internal memoranda in the legal agencies deined the campaign as a 
time to uncover the courts’ many laws and review the work of every judge.17 
the Ministry of justice was no longer willing to wait for its cadres to study in 
order to perform better. In a july 1948 report to the Central Committee, ussr 
Minister of justice konstantin Gorshenin wrote that the “most important task in 
the preparation for the election of people’s courts was the strengthening of judicial 
cadres with politically vetted, experienced, educated, and authoritative people.” He 
went on to provide statistics on the low percentages of secondary and higher legal 
education amongst his cadres.18 the elections would serve as another stimulus for 
judges to perform their duties properly and attain the appropriate legal education or 
else they would be replaced by more capable individuals.
For republican and regional legal agencies, the campaign to elect people’s 
courts was a test administered by the leadership in Moscow. Most of the criticism 
behind the campaign targeted local judges and other regional legal workers, and, 
in many ways, the campaign was a mechanism for the Ministry of justice to 
strengthen control over the provinces. For that matter, the Ministry began to bring 
its local oficials into line months before the campaign went public. In july 1948, 
at a meeting of republican deputies of the Ministry of justice and heads of regional 
legal agencies, Gorshenin reminded his provincial cadres that people’s courts 
16. solomon, soviet Criminal justice under stalin, 339-340.
17. GArF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 135, l. 2-3.
18. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 711, l. 5.
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were a critical meeting point between the population and the state.19 the quality 
of the judges and lay assessors serving at people’s courts shaped the population’s 
impressions of the state more broadly. 
Gorshenin warned his audience that with the coming of the elections of people’s 
courts, the times when judges were not reviewed for years at a time were over. now 
that judges had to be elected according to article 109 of the 1936 constitution, judges 
could no longer be arbitrarily and easily replaced with the help of local executive 
committees. local legal oficials could either rise to the challenge of nominating 
respectable and qualiied candidates for election or they would “lose their heads.”20 
Gorshenin urged that judges who were corrupt or drunkards not be put in front 
of the people, and if local oficials tried to hide such cadres from the government 
they would be corrected by soviet citizens.21 the election campaigns gave soviet 
citizens many opportunities to voice their opinions about local legal cadres and how 
they were doing their jobs, to inform the top leadership about the state of affairs in 
the localities, and to spur local legal oficials to improve their work.
Gorshenin’s threats to his regional and republican cadres implied that they 
were the ones responsible for the failures of the legal system. Instead of solely 
blaming people’s court judges for their poor performance, Gorshenin saw these 
shortcomings as a relection of poor selection and oversight of cadres at the local 
level. the shift towards elections as a means of picking judges would take away 
some of the arbitrary power of local legal agencies over the justice system, yet 
Moscow still relied on these local oficials to review and help nominate qualiied 
candidates for election. thus, Gorshenin’s critical comments were likely a forceful 
attempt to bring the Ministry’s local agencies into line with Moscow’s standards 
on how to pick appropriate judicial candidates. In this way, the campaign to elect 
judges was a mechanism for the leadership in Moscow to exert greater control over 
its agencies in the provinces.
In october 1948, a few short months before the elections of people’s courts, 
Gorshenin again went on the attack at a meeting of the All soviet Active judicial 
Workers. Following his earlier track, Gorshenin warned his audience that 
candidates put up for election as people’s court judges should be politically and 
morally qualiied beyond a “shadow of a doubt.”22 After hearing the many speakers 
at the meeting, Gorshenin returned to the issue of picking appropriate cadres in his 
concluding remarks. He implored his audience, 
Do not forget that your selection of cadres should be thorough and careful, but that does not mean that in all cases your voters will accept this or that candidate nominated by you. Interestingly, as candidates are nominated in some districts 
19. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 182, l. 66.
20. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 182, l. 67.
21. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 182, l. 68, “Vas grazhdane popraviat.”
22. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 183, l. 90. 
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the number of signals and appeals increases about judicial workers, which demands examination.23 
For Gorshenin, the importance of being sensitive to popular signals during the 
elections points to the role of the population in soviet democracy. no matter how 
well qualiied a selected candidate was, the inal decision on a nomination rested 
with the population, according to Gorshenin. In case popular dissatisfaction with 
a nominated candidate arose, Gorshenin instructed the oficials in the audience 
to prepare a reserve of qualiied candidates that they could turn to. the emphasis 
Gorshenin and other oficials put on popular participation in the elections relects 
the central role the population played in the campaigns.
In fact, one of the reasons that legal and party elites organized the elections 
was a commitment to educate the population about soviet law. kalashnikov, a 
member of the agitation and propaganda section of the Central Committee, called 
the election campaign a “school for the political education of the working masses.” 
the campaign mobilized lectures, ilms, radio programs, and newspaper articles 
to teach the population about the role of people’s courts, the bases of Soviet law, 
and about the rules of the new elections.24 the election campaign would “raise the 
legal consciousness of soviet citizens” and popularize the democratic principles of 
the organization and activity of soviet courts.25 the Central Committee sent out an 
oficial set of instructions in the fall of 1948 detailing the pedagogical basis for the 
campaign to elect people’s courts.26
the instructions explained how people’s courts were inherently tied to the 
population and even an expression of their will. they portrayed soviet courts as a 
tool of justice that severely eliminated criminal elements amongst the population 
and battled against the vestiges of capitalism in people’s consciousnesses; soviet 
courts propagated social norms and legal order in soviet society.27 the depiction 
of a judge and two lay assessors standing proudly and sternly in an election-time 
newspaper illustrated that Soviet courts were inclusive and representative of 
broader soviet society with young and old and male and female staff. the clear 
implication in this piece of propaganda was that the courts were the voice of the 
population rather than monied or political interests.28 In 1951, agitators organized 
2,372 lectures and reports, as well as 5,844 conversations with groups of voters, 
and 550 exhibits during the electoral campaign in ukraine alone.29 Some common 
titles of lectures from this torrent of agitation and propaganda included “the stalin 
23. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 183, l. 377.
24. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 183, l. 349.
25. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 243, l. 289.
26. this document is available at GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 711, l. 49-74.
27. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 711, l. 50.
28. “sovetskii sud = sud naroda!” kommunist (saratov), 16/12/1951, (no. 294).
29. GAnIso, f. 594, op. 2, d. 701, l. 174- 182.
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Constitution – the Most Democratic Constitution in the World,” “Courts under 
socialism and Capitalism,” “soviet justice,” and “the Educational role of soviet 
Courts” among many others. Hundreds of people in every locality throughout the 
soviet union attended these lectures by party agitators, local lawyers, judges, and 
prosecutors.30
Campaign propaganda and agitation often juxtaposed soviet courts with those 
of the capitalist West.31 “Bourgeois courts” were portrayed as tools of the wealthy, 
while soviet courts as serving the interests of the working classes. these types 
of propaganda often focused on such social ills of capitalist society as racism 
and poverty, and claimed that bourgeois law served the interests of Wall street 
and ignored the needs and rights of the masses. serhy  Yekelchyk shows in his 
work on political elections after World War II that the emphasis on the opposition 
between soviet democracy and an outside “other” could also be a strategy to delect 
attention from the fact that soviet elections ultimately only permitted one candidate 
to be put forward for each position.32 
Finally, internal discussions by oficials in the legal agencies illustrate their 
commitment to the pedagogical ideals of the elections. When drafting the 
regulations for the elections of people’s courts, the top leadership in the Ministry 
of justice debated the value of changing the wording of several clauses. Deputy 
Minister of justice kudriavtsev implored his colleagues to be attentive to how they 
altered the text not just stylistically, but also politically. He insisted that the text “be 
written intelligibly, so that it would be understandable to every collective farmer.”33 
kudriavtsev’s appeal to keep the text simple and clear represented a common 
desire amongst legal elites to use the elections to reach the population and instruct 
them about the value of soviet law and courts. such educational work would be 
the ultimate weapon in a battle against the persistence of corruption and poorly 
functioning courts.
Popular responses
throughout the lectures and meetings that soviet citizens attended during the 
campaign, local oficials kept a meticulous record of all questions and comments. 
Much of the state’s information gathering focused on the proper fulillment 
of the meetings and lectures planned for the campaign. oficials also carefully 
documented campaign shortcomings and voices of criticism.
the leadership in Moscow quickly realized that the propagandists who 
lectured about the democratic ideals of the stalin constitution struggled to learn 
30. GAnIso, f. 594, op. 2, d. 629, l. 32-33.
31. GAnIso, f. 594, op. 2, d. 629, l. 51.
32. serhy Yekelchyk, “Electoral Campaigns,” unpublished book chapter. I would like to thank serhy Yekelchyck for sharing this chapter-in-progress with me.
33. GArF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 74, l. 18.
 sHAPInG soVIEt justICE 129 
for themselves the very characteristics they were supposed to teach. For example, 
after a lecture about the election campaign in the city of saratov, the audience 
asked a local agitator named Maksimov several basic questions about the election 
campaign, which he proceeded to answer incorrectly. In just one example, 
Maksimov informed his audience that their district would elect a single judge 
and 75 lay assessors. In a typical voting district (uchastok) this would have been 
accurate. However, Maksimov spoke in a raion that contained three voting districts 
and thus required a total of three judges and 225 lay assessors to be elected. Finally, 
the audience asked Maksimov why the elections of judges were being held in 1948 
for the irst time, and his response was, “I don’t know for sure, evidently there was 
never a chance before.”34
In response to the widespread incompetence of the state’s agitators, local oficials 
scrambled to organize special seminars to train those whose duty it was to instruct 
the population.35 Propaganda and agitation oficials even resorted to including 
sections in local newspapers, with the heading “Help for agitators,” that were 
illed with talking points about the main ideological lessons that these individuals 
were supposed to be disseminating.36 newspapers also published pre-prepared 
lectures and the Moscow leadership sent guidebooks to the provinces with common 
questions and answers about the elections to further assist those responsible for 
enlightening the masses about soviet justice. In the end, these efforts were largely 
insuficient, as shown by the basic questions posed by the population after many 
lectures during the campaign. the fact that people asked, “How is soviet justice 
organized?” or even “What are law, government, and rights?” implies that they 
were not absorbing the barrage of information directed at them to answer those 
exact questions.37
nevertheless, there were also very self-interested and practical questions that 
illustrate how soviet citizens attempted to use this pedagogical opportunity to 
pursue their own interests. In the village of shevchenkovo, ukraine, an individual 
asked, “What is the procedure for iling a cassational appeal?”38 An agitator in 
Chernigovskaia oblast was asked, “What is the punishment for the refusal to pay 
alimony?”39 A person from Drogobychskaia oblast, ukraine, asked, “Who checks if 
a prosecutor incorrectly closes a case?”40 these individuals had enough knowledge 
about soviet laws and court procedures to ask pointed and strategic questions that 
likely were of real interest to them. 
34. GAnIso, f. 594, op. 2, d. 701, l. 14-15.
35. GAnIso, f. 594, op. 2, d. 701, l. 26-7.
36. For an example, see kommunist (saratov), 16/11/1954: 2. 
37. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 715, l. 20-21.
38. tsDAHo, f. 1, op. 70, d. 2092, l. 124.
39. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 715, l. 20.
40. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 715, l. 20.
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Audiences took advantage of the opportunity to quiz agitators about non-legal 
issues as well. In fact, they used the question-and-answer sessions following 
lectures as an opportunity to air a broad array of grievances much like they did 
during political election campaigns. thus, in the city of konotop, people asked, 
“Why is the battle with theft going poorly?” “Why are there often shortages of 
water and electricity?” “Why does our bread factory produce incompletely baked 
bread?” “Why do stores get soap by the box-full, and sell only a maximum 
of 50 pieces?”41 these questions provide a window into the dificult conditions 
of postwar life in soviet ukraine and russia. the open and public expression 
of these concerns at election-time lectures indicates that the population saw the 
campaign as an opportune moment to raise such issues. the assumption contained 
in the questions is that the oficials present at the lectures would also be concerned 
about the points being raised and would be willing to address them. 
If the election campaign is seen as a time of exchange or negotiation between the 
state and population, the open criticism that basic social needs were unmet was one 
way the population could make demands on the state in return for their participation 
in the elections and the months of agitation and meetings preceding them.42 the 
state often responded to these demands for improvements in the basic conditions 
of life, and, in the example above, the oficials in konotop followed through by 
ensuring that the local bread factory began to bake better bread.43
Following the election-time lectures, local soviets and legal workers had the 
population nominate individuals from amongst themselves to act as the future judges 
of their local criminal and civil disputes. to pick the candidates for the judgeship 
in every voting district, people typically gathered in assemblies at the factories 
or collective farms where they worked. At these gatherings, a party member or 
someone from the workplace or local administration would nominate a candidate 
for the local judgeship. this nomination would be followed by a biography of the 
relevant person and a public discussion of their suitability for the job; whereupon 
the people could invoke whatever they learned from the campaign lectures they 
attended. the ideal candidate for a judgeship would have a legal education and be 
in good standing in the community without any previous convictions. However, 
any individual over the age of 23 with no criminal history could be nominated.44
Most frequently, the populace accepted the person nominated by the authorities 
with little resistance. nevertheless, the people did have the ability to reject 
candidates and nominate their own choices. In one case, in stalinskii district of 
saratov oblast, a certain lopatnikov was nominated for a judgeship at a meeting 
41. tsDAHo, f. 1, op. 23, d. 5997, l. 9 ob.
42. serhy Yekelchyk, “Electoral Campaigns”, 20. Also see Victor Zaslavsky and robert j. Brym, “the Functions of Elections in the ussr,” 367.
43. tsDAHo, f. 1, op. 23, d. 5997, l. 9 ob.
44. see Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv saratovskoi oblasti (GAso) f. 2605, op. 2, d. 18 and GAso, f. 2605, op. 2, d. 19. For details on eligibility for elections see Polozhenie o vyborakh narodnykh sudov (1948) or GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 711, l. 4.
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in the lenin factory. During this meeting he was praised highly and the regional 
newspaper even printed a biography of him highlighting that he was the son 
of a poor peasant. However, on the following day it was discovered with some 
anonymous help that his parents were kulaks and he was hiding his background 
from the authorities. His candidacy was quickly withdrawn and another person was 
nominated.45 these types of problems led the Party to exert a tremendous amount of 
pressure on local authorities to do thorough background checks on their nominees.
In another instance, a meeting of the communist organization at factory no. 236 
in saratov oblast rejected three communists nominated as lay assessors. A military 
representative named litvinenko denounced one of the nominees, Bugrova, as 
someone who did not regard her work at the factory seriously. As a result, Bugrova 
only received eight votes from the 76 people attending the meeting.46 In this way 
the population could remove nominated candidates, although the most common 
reasons for disqualiication of candidates had to do with the discovery of hidden 
criminal records, suspect behavior during the second World War, or the fact that 
they did not meet the age qualiication to be elected.
In many districts, the population nominated the incumbent judge for the local 
judgeship. several times each year, these local judges presented a report explaining 
their performance to the people in their voting district. Following this report, the 
population gave its own evaluation of the judge’s performance and how the legal 
organs were working in their area. According to the detailed summaries of these 
meetings, the people did not hesitate to express their opinions about how poorly the 
system conformed to its ideals. 
Along with the nomination and approval of candidates, these review meetings 
are an example of how the campaign to elect judges brought the people and 
the courts closer together, in accordance with the stated ideological goals of the 
campaign. In total, nearly ifty thousand of such meetings took place across 
the soviet union during the irst campaign to elect judges in 1948.47 one of the most 
common criticisms leveled at the judges was their infrequent propaganda work 
amongst the population. For example, comrade timoshenko from kirovgradskaia 
oblast in ukraine said at a review meeting: 
I have worked at this alcohol factory for six years, but I am seeing our people’s judge, comrade ogareva, for the irst time here. this shows that comrade ogareva, like a people’s deputy, does not fulill her responsibilities suficiently. If court workers visited our factory more often and if they visited collective farms and explained soviet laws, there would be signiicantly less crime in our district.48 
45. GAnIso, f. 594, op. 2, d. 618, l. 3.
46. GAnIso, f. 594, op. 2, d. 618, l. 6.
47. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 651, l. 1.
48. tsentral´nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady i upravlinnia ukrainy (tsDAVoVu), f. 8, op. 3, d. 42, l. 63.
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the common complaints about judges in this vein illustrate that the people learned 
in the course of the campaign that judges’ duties included giving lectures at least 
twice a month on legal topics. It also shows a desire to learn about these topics, 
which would likely have had practical value for anyone interested in resolving their 
disputes in the soviet legal system or harboring concerns about crime.
Beyond the shortage of lectures, people expressed concern about their safety 
and rampant crime. they especially urged their judges to crack down on cases of 
hooliganism, theft of private property, and violations of labor laws. they openly 
called for more repression in these cases and criticized their judges for being too 
liberal in punishing criminals. the discourse on postwar crime in the reports from 
these meetings reveals a plea from the population to have law and order restored in 
their daily life.49 People repeatedly complained about uncultured public behavior 
such as ighting and foul language. At one of these review meetings in serpukhovo 
an attendee said: 
Parents let their children run wild. kids play football in the apartment building and break the windows, etc. A battle needs to be fought against such parents, and if that won’t help they should be evicted.50 
suggestions to ameliorate the rampant crime perceived in soviet society included 
harsher penalties and more unusual solutions like show trials. Comrade teslenko 
in ukraine suggested: 
thieves and hooligans need to be punished more strictly. I would ask the judge to come out to our village, Zaporozh´e-levoe, and try them here on the spot so that others will not dare commit such crimes [chtoby drugim nepovadno bylo].51
the persistence of these concerns and the consistent legal discourse on postwar 
crime seen in the review meetings of the irst three postwar elections demonstrate 
that the social anxiety about crime described by Elena Zubkova continued beyond 
just the irst postwar years.52 the continuation of this legal discourse up until at least 
1954 is perhaps an indication that the population was losing whatever remaining 
faith it had in the soviet legal system and its ability to maintain law and order. 
49. the postwar years in russia and ukraine were a time of increased crime. see, serhy Yekelchyk, “Policing Postwar kyiv: Crime, social Control, and a Demoralized Militia”, journal of ukrainian studies, Forthcoming 2010 issue, and Elena Zubkova, Poslevoennoe sovetskoe obshchestvo: Politika i povsednevnost´. 1945-1953 (M.: rossPEn, 2000).
50. GArF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 711, l. 91.
51. tsDAVoVu, f. 8, op. 3, d. 40, l. 80. this individual could have been recalling the agitation trials of the pre-World War  II soviet union. see, Elizabeth A.  Wood, Performing justice: Agitation trials in Early soviet russia (Ithaca, nY: Cornell university Press, 2005).
52. In her book, Zubkova argues that concern about crime receded with the start of the famine of 1946-1947. see Elena Zubkova, russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957 (new York: M.E. sharpe, 1998): 38-39.
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the central place of hooliganism and crimes against social order in the discussions 
at review meetings also provides a preview of what the anti-hooligan campaign 
that the state initiated in the 1950s would target. the widespread public concern 
about hooliganism evident during the khrushchev period clearly had antecedents 
in the immediate postwar years.53
Finally, at election-time review meetings attendees highlighted the incompetence 
and corruption of their local legal workers. A voter named svish expressed his 
doubts at a review meeting in the city of Melitopol´: “What kind of active 
participation of lay assessors during a case could there be when they don’t know 
the elementary rules of court process and the norms of material rights.”54 others 
similarly expressed misgivings about the lay assessors and judges in their local 
courts by questioning the amount of training they received and their performance, 
although few dismissed their knowledge as completely as svish. 
legal and party oficials interpreted this lood of complaints and questions 
from the population as a sign that the campaigns were working to improve the 
accountability of the courts. After all, the authorities were receiving evidence 
showing how the population seemingly desired stronger socialist justice. 
Furthermore, the state acted on criticisms of its legal system by transforming 
popular complaints into plans for how to change the way the legal system worked 
after the elections. 
In this way, the population’s criticisms helped shape the post-election legal 
system. the state implemented detailed plans to train the newly elected judges in the 
proper ways to deal with the crimes that were so often identiied as being too softly 
punished, such as theft and hooliganism. legal oficials from Moscow scheduled 
obligatory special seminars to instruct the judges of all their duties, including their 
often overlooked educational role amongst the population. the Ministry of justice 
ordered more oversight of the judges’ work and demanded that they study a list 
of selected legal works deemed necessary for every judge.55 In this way, the state 
attempted to eliminate any of the identiied failures in its performance of soviet 
ideals with quick and decisive action.
Election Day
the conclusion of the campaign involved the largely ceremonial and festive process 
of voting for the candidate nominated in each voting district. At this stage, the 
voting that took place only allowed for the afirmation of the nominated candidate 
53. For more on hooliganism and the anti-hooliganism campaign see, Brian laPierre, “redefining Deviance: Policing and Punishing Hooliganism in khrushchev’s russia, 1953-1964”, PhD Dissertation, university of Chicago, 2006. 
54. tsDAVoVu, f. 8, op. 3, d. 40, l. 81.
55. For a characteristic example of the state’s plans in response to the critical remarks of the population see, tsDAVoVu, f. 8, op. 3, d. 40, l. 62-66.
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or a vote against them. there were no alternative candidates and unsurprisingly over 
99 percent cast their votes for their nominated candidate. Beyond the performative 
and symbolic nature of casting a ballot, election day presented people with a time 
to celebrate and show off their “democratic” rights. As part of election day, each 
voting district organized a celebration with childcare, food, and entertainment for 
the voters of the area.56 
In the village of trostianets, ukraine on the eve of judicial elections in early 
1949, election oficials brought a ballot box to the home of a sick villager named 
sidirich. responding excitedly to the oficials who took the time to collect his 
individual ballot, sidirich is reported to have said: 
I have survived sixty three years and I have lived under three different governments, the Austrian, Polish, and Fascist regimes. However, for the irst time in my life I am seeing such care and attention paid to simple people and thus, with great joy, I am voting for the just soviet court.57 
Around the same time in the village of Podgorodnoe, ukraine a 70-year old woman 
resettled from Poland named Mariia onis´kiv said upon voting: 
In Poland I did not have the right to vote, because I was not considered equal to others. In order to select a judge in Poland you had to be wealthy, but I was a poor woman. now I am voting as an equal soviet individual, as a collective farmer for the best people of our glorious motherland.58 
these personal narratives are just two examples of the mass of such testimonials 
that party and state oficials collected during the campaigns to elect people’s courts 
in 1948. the state’s information gathering practices during the election campaigns 
involved sending waves of such testimonials from every locality up the political 
ladder from the district level to the oblast, republic and inally the union level. 
Further, local oficials had to submit statistical reports about the progress of 
voting every two hours on election day up this same hierarchy of authority. these 
information gathering practices raise questions about why soviet oficials worked 
to compile so many of these personal narratives throughout the judicial elections in 
ukraine and russia, and why the state committed so much attention to an election 
campaign whose outcome was never in doubt.
When analyzing the scores of personal narratives contained in oficial 
documents, it must be noted that the overwhelming majority of them are formulaic 
and relective of the ideological lessons imparted during the campaigns. It would 
be easy to conclude that these testimonies were simply propagandistic slogans 
repeated during the campaigns. lewis siegelbaum writes about similar personal 
56. GAnIso, f. 594, op. 2, d. 629, l. 57.
57. tsDAVoVu, f. r-1, op. 20, d. 191, l. 149.
58. tsDAHo, f. 1, op. 23, d. 5998, l. 46.
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narratives in the 1930s. He argues that “the demonstration of acclaim was an 
essential ingredient of ‘soviet democracy’, reinforcing the notion that the party 
was guiding the masses along the path toward the bright future.”59 siegelbaum even 
implies that oficials would often alter the personal narratives collected in order to 
be sure they it the “correct course” that the campaign was supposed to go in.60
Although siegelbaum’s points are insightful, the election-time personal 
narratives collected by the state cannot be considered proof that the population 
somehow internalized the lessons of the campaign or that these statements of 
afirmation were the result of local oficials trying to deceive their superiors into 
thinking that the campaigns were going smoothly. there is more to these narratives, 
otherwise they would not have made it up the ladder of authority to the very top 
of the soviet hierarchy in Moscow. nor would local oficials have bothered to 
spend much time creating personal narratives that it the “correct course” when 
the documents they produced often included examples of shortcomings in the 
campaigns and statements that were contrary to the ideals being taught.
Instead, these personal narratives reveal both the ways that individual citizens 
learned to adapt to life in the postwar soviet union and the underlying fears and 
insecurities of soviet oficials after the second World War. the quintessential 
author of these testimonials was an elderly peasant or worker who recalled their 
memories of life under the unjust rule of Imperial russia, interwar Poland, or any 
other non-soviet state. thus we have Anna nikolaevna Petuk from the village of 
novye troiany, ukraine saying: 
I am 110  years old. I remember serfdom well, when people were sold and exchanged for dogs. soviet power gave us happiness in our lives. I am voting for our own stalin, for soviet power, which freed us from slavery.61 
As another example we have semen Vasil´evich siianko, a 98-year old peasant 
from the village of Iastrebovo, ukraine who said upon voting: 
In my long life I had to live among the Austrians, Hungarians, and Polish and nowhere did I see the kind of democratic power that is here. By voting for a people’s court judge and lay assessors, I am voting for the leader of the soviet people, comrade stalin.62
Both of these personal narratives illustrate the ways that these individuals were 
quickly adapting to soviet ideals and thus incorporating themselves into their new 
polity. stephen kotkin calls this “the process of ‘positive integration’ through which 
59. lewis siegelbaum, Andrei sokolov, stalinism as a Way of life (new York: Yale uP, 2000): 15.
60. Ibid., 171.
61. tsDAHo, f. 1, op. 23, d. 5740, l. 12.
62. tsDAHo, f. 1, op. 23, d. 5998, l. 46.
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people became part of the ‘oficial society’” by learning “the terms at issue and 
the techniques of engagement.”63 In this way the two peasants “speak Bolshevik” 
in order to demonstrate their assimilation into soviet society, which is of critical 
importance because of their uncertain backgrounds as people with long experiences 
living under non-soviet regimes. As Amir  Weiner has shown, after the second 
World War the soviet state began to abandon its faith in the power of nurture over 
nature and in its ability to mold people as it had aspired to prior to the war.64 
this is relevant to these personal narratives because many of the individuals 
quoted in oficial documents had the experience of living outside of the soviet 
union prior to the second World War. the ways that these individuals would 
be incorporated into the newly expanded soviet polity became a pressing issue 
for the authorities. Individuals had to prove they belonged and these personal 
narratives show they did so by “speaking Bolshevik” and emphasizing their reliable 
backgrounds as poor and working class individuals. For example, a worker named 
slabyi from Dobromil´skii district said: 
I am a working miner and I have been in America, Germany, [and] France. However, for the irst time in my life I am voting for a judge, participating in elections in the just soviet union. this is only possible in the soviet union.65 
Delecting his suspect background of living in several capitalist countries, slabyi 
illustrated his integration into soviet society by claiming working class status 
while afirming the democratic ideals he was taught about the soviet legal system. 
the same can be said for Mariia onis´kiv, the peasant from Poland quoted above. 
onis´kiv carefully points out that she was a poor woman in Poland suffering from 
injustice and inequality until her fortunate arrival in soviet ukraine, where she 
could inally enjoy equal rights as a collective farmer. 
From the perspective of the state, if nothing else, the systematic collection of 
such personal narratives indicates that there was a strong institutional interest in 
knowing what the population said during the elections. the choice of testimonies 
relects anxieties on the part of the Moscow leadership about what do to with its 
postwar population. While each of the quoted personal narratives ends on a positive 
note with the individual declaring their support for stalin or their gratitude for being 
able to democratically elect their local courts for the irst time, for soviet oficials 
these narratives likely were not simply a positive afirmation of a campaign well on 
its way to success. 
63. stephen kotkin, Magnetic Mountain (Berkeley: university of California Press, 1997): 236-237.
64. Amir Weiner, “nature, nurture, and Memory in a socialist utopia: Delineating the soviet socio-Ethnic Body in the Age of socialism”, the American Historical Review, 104, 4 (october 1999): 1114-1155.
65. tsDAVoVu, f. r-1, op. 20, d. 191, l. 148.
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For postwar soviet oficials these narratives were fraught with suspicious facts 
that could be the basis for major concern. one of the recurring themes in Ministry 
of justice documents and in the writing of legal elites after the second World 
War was the necessity of battling the remnants of capitalism in the population’s 
consciousness. It was widely feared that the population became compromised after 
exposure to nazi propaganda and occupation policy.66 Further, many repatriated 
people and refugees who were living in the territory of the soviet union after the 
war had long experienced non-communist forms of government during the interwar 
or war years. All these individuals were now potentially carrying the seeds of 
capitalism around with them and thus posed a challenge to the paranoid soviet state 
in its attempts to instill the proper ideals of socialist justice. Consequently, when 
comrade slabyi admitted to living in France, Germany, and America he fed into 
these anxieties about the remnants of capitalism entrenched among soviet oficials 
and legal elites. 
An individual’s activities and location during the second World War became a 
critical social and political marker after the war. As the soviet authorities struggled 
to rebuild their country and restore the legal system, thorough background checks 
were required for potential judges, prosecutors, or defense attorneys. Individuals 
who were found to be living in the nazi- or romanian-occupied territories were 
immediately suspect and burdened with the responsibility of proving that they did 
not collaborate. jeffrey Brooks describes how after the second World War 
an art specialist recalled questions about whether individuals or their relatives had resided in occupied lands during the war on forms “the soviet citizen was compelled repeatedly to ill out when getting a passport, taking a job, entering an educational institution, or joining the komsomol or the Party.”67 
Many candidates for legal positions were removed or barred from serving because 
they or one of their relatives were suspected of collaborating with the occupiers. 
At a meeting on the Paris Commune collective farm in ukraine, the discussion 
surrounding the nomination of collective farmer taran to be a lay assessor stalled 
when it became clear that she had lived among members of the occupying forces 
during the War. Consequently, taran’s fellow collective farmers decided to 
nominate a different candidate as their lay assessor.68 taran was hardly alone in 
losing her prospects for advancement in postwar soviet society as a result of her 
wartime behavior. thus, the information gathering practices of the state relect 
concerns about the postwar soviet polity on the part of legal and state oficials.
66. For a discussion of such concerns see Yekelchyk, “Electoral Campaigns”, 11; and jeffrey W. jones, Everyday life and the “reconstruction” of soviet russia during and After the Great Patriotic War, 1943-1948 (Bloomington, In: slavica, 2008): 227-228.
67. jeffrey Brooks, thank You, Comrade stalin! (Princeton, nj: Princeton uP, 2000): 197.
68. tsDAHo, f. 1, op. 23, d. 5997, l. 42.
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In contrast to the personal narratives of voters analyzed above, some people 
responded to their obligatory performances of soviet ideals on election day without 
the intended enthusiasm. oficials discovered ballots that were defaced or with such 
messages on them as, “I don’t want this.”69 one man in saratov region, upon voting 
said: “I am voting for a box of matches.”70 At the other end of the spectrum, many 
spontaneously and anonymously wrote messages on their ballots such as, “Glory 
to the soviet constitution”, “I am voting for the most just court in the world”, and 
“I give you my vote and I order you to work honestly.”71 
such exhortations to work honestly relect how soviet citizens could express 
their expectations and values on these ballots. others exempliied a similar tact by 
writing on their ballots “strictly adhere to revolutionary justice,” “We all ask you 
to try bandits, and we wish you success in your work,” and “Battle more against 
hooligans.”72 People also wrote messages about the speciic judges nominated 
in their areas. thus, one ballot found by oficials read, “she is not deserving of 
a judgeship.”73 Another person in saratov wrote, “they do not have enough 
experience.”74 the spontaneous messages written on ballots demonstrate that 
soviet citizens yearned for honest and experienced judges that severely enforced 
law and order. they showed concern about the quality of their local judges and 
suggested the values that they wished observed by their legal oficials. these ballot 
messages echo the underlying concern about crimes such as theft and hooliganism 
that people also emphasized in their criticisms of judges and questions following 
lectures earlier in the election campaign.
Conclusion
the elections of people’s courts were a key stage where state and popular 
interests met. However, many of the sources providing insights into popular 
responses to soviet justice and postwar life are problematic. they often do not 
provide biographical information about the individuals quoted and rarely include 
descriptions of the broader context of the reported quotation. Although it is dificult 
to make generalizations from these sources, the popular responses to the election 
campaigns can help to gain insights into postwar soviet society. the repeated 
concerns about public order and rampant crime evident in popular responses from 
a variety of election-time meetings, ballot messages, and lectures corroborate and 
reinforce impressions that might be strictly problematic coming from a single 
69. GAnIso, f. 594, op. 2, d. 629, l. 49-50.
70. GAnIso, f. 594, op. 2, d. 629, l. 49-50.
71. GAnIso, f. 594, op. 2, d. 629, l. 49-50, 75-76.
72. GAnIso, f. 594, op. 2, d. 1920, l. 259, GAnIso, f 94, op. 2, d. 3046, l. 107, 121.
73. GAnIso f. 594, op. 2, d. 629, l. 30 (ob).
74. GAnIso f. 594, op. 2, d. 1920, l. 283.
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source. the article has shown how people responded differently to the election 
campaigns while also illustrating the concerns that seemed the most widespread. 
this necessarily leads to an incomplete picture, but one that still provides useful 
insights into the history of postwar soviet society. 
the process of the performance and enactment of soviet ideals, although full of 
failures and illustrative of the poor state of affairs at the lowest levels of the justice 
system, ensured that both local oficials and the population knew at least something 
more about the legal side of soviet ideology than before the campaigns. the fact 
that the performance rested on the enactment of these ideals through the nomination 
of candidates and then voting for them only further reinforced the lessons the state 
wished to teach. In this way, the state constructed and disseminated the ideals that 
it hoped to espouse to the broader world. By having the population complete the 
performance with the symbolic popular election of judges, the state was essentially 
proving the full “democratic” nature of its people’s courts and integrating those 
suspect individuals recently incorporated into the soviet polity.
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